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Abstract
With growing concerns regarding natural resources security over the last fifty 
years, a range of movements, including the notion of the tragedy of the 
commons suggest how to enhance sustainability of natural resources. A case in 
point is the discourse on the necessity of introducing regulatory and market 
schemes for the challenges to the sustainability of the commons. This article, 
inter alia, highlights the literature on the tragedy of the commons, in order to 
understand its theoretical and practical strengths, and examine the applicability 
of its core ideas to current issues of water security. As contemporary water 
security problems are interconnected and complex, the article challenges the 
adequacy and effectiveness of coercive regulatory arrangements to individual 
water users’ behavior in sustaining water security. It also examines the 
variation of new initiatives (in natural resources management) from the 
traditional perspectives of the tragedy of the commons. It is argued that 
introducing coercive regulatory institutional arrangements is not by itself 
sufficient because water security may require comprehensive regulatory and 
non-regulatory institutional arrangements at national and transnational levels 
(supplemented by comprehensive implementation strategies) to address a range 
of water pressures.
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Introduction
Where natural resources experience little pressure and in the absence of scarcity 
problems, regulatory intervention may not be so important.* 1 The theory of the 
tragedy of the commons calls for the commons to be appropriated. When such
* LLM (Addis Ababa University Law school), MSC (University of Kent, School of 
Anthropology and Conservation), PhD candidate at Kent Law School, University of 
Kent The author is available at aha24@kent.ac.uk
1 James Salzman and Barton H. Thompson (2010). Environmental Law and Policy, 3rd 
Edition, Thomson Reuters, p.47.
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appropriation is not possible, the theory suggests the introduction of regulatory 
intervention, which limits the access to and use of the commons. Hardin’s 
coercive regulatory remedy focuses on the behaviour and control of individual 
users in limiting access to and use of scarce natural resources. From a water 
security point of view, the focus of this theory is to introduce coercive 
regulatory schemes for the demand of water users. The implication of this 
remedy is that a lack of coercive regulatory instruments for water demand 
management is a root problem for the water resources tragedy.
This study argues that approaching water resources problems in terms of the 
regulation of individual water users’ demand management may have its own 
positive contribution to enhancing water sustainability, if the institutional 
arrangements for demand management are comprehensive enough to address a 
range of water over-exploitation problems. However, contemporary water 
security challenges are diverse by their nature, and these problems do not 
always stem from lack of coercive regulatory institutions for water demand 
management.
Enhancing water security needs to be approached through multifaceted 
regulatory and other institutional arrangements, which are beyond the regulation 
of individual water users’ behaviour. Such institutional arrangements should be 
introduced more inclusively and comprehensively to address the range of water 
security pressures, including controlling the behaviour of riparian states, which 
the tragedy of the commons has barely addressed. More importantly, regulatory 
rules by themselves may not bring about change without introducing effective 
implementation strategies. Considering all these challenges, the central 
argument of this study is that lack of proper institutional arrangements for water 
demand management may be part of the problem for contemporary water 
security challenges.
The academic inquiry in this article re-frames the tragedy of the commons 
debate in relation to water security, in the orientation that the regulatory 
arrangements themselves for the demand of individual water users should be 
comprehensive enough to address a range of water pressures. However, present 
day water security challenge may need non-coercive regulatory institutions. it is 
argued that the tragedy of the commons theory should be re-framed to an 
orientation that understands water security challenges from the perspectives of 
the interconnected and complex problems that need integrated water resources 
management with a view to addressing a range of water security threats.
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1. Basic Assumptions of the Tragedy of the Commons 
Theory
1.1 The concepts of the tragedy of the commons
The fear of the ruin of scarce natural resources by human action is not a new 
idea. Hardin published an article in Science Journal in December 1968, entitled 
‘The Tragedy of the Commons’.2 Subsequently, this notion has been widely 
discussed and has dominated scholarship in different disciplines. Since its 
publication, the article has been widely reprinted in scientific journals and 
quoted across disciplines.3
The tragedy of the commons theory embodies two key words: ‘tragedy’ and 
‘commons’. The word ‘tragedy' is not seen in the usual theatrical sense. Hardin 
stated that ‘[t]he essence of dramatic tragedy is not unhappiness. It resides in the 
solemnity of the remorseless working of things.’4 Until the commons are ruined, 
rational individual users generate the maximum possible benefits, whilst leaving 
the cost of over-exploitation of the commons. Hardin further underlined the idea 
that ‘ [t]his inevitableness of destiny can only be illustrated in terms of human 
life by incidents which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is only by them that 
the futility of escape can be made evident in the drama.’5
Similarly, the tragedy of the commons uses the word ‘commons' frequently. 
Hardin described ‘commons’ as a common pool of resources where access to 
natural resources is open to all persons.6 These resources are freely available to 
anyone in the system and are unregulated. Similarly, Crowe defined the concept 
‘commons’ as ‘a social institution... some environmental objects, which have 
never been, and should never be, exclusively appropriated to any individual or 
group of individuals’.7 In his description, Crowe includes such things as water, 
the atmosphere and living space as ‘commons’.8An example that Hardin used is 
that of open-access pastureland, in which no user has the prerogative to exclude 
others from use, and all users are equally entitled to use it without any
2 Garrett Hardin (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244.
3 Ian Angus, Socialist Voice: Marxists Perspectives for the 21’st Century, August 24, 
2008.
4 Hardin, supra note 2, pp. 1243-1248.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Berly Crowe (1969). ‘The Tragedy of the Commons Revisited’, Science, News Series
166(399) 1103-1107.
8Ibid.
restriction. There have been criticisms against Hardin’s usage of the term 
‘commons’ to describe open-access resources.9
1.2 A large number of people as owners
Hardin’s notion of the tragedy of the commons was not a new finding. It roots 
and assumptions are partly related with Aristotle’s perspectives. Aristotle had 
stated that anything that ‘is common to the greatest number has the least care 
bestowed on it’.10 Noticeably, Aristotle observed that the nature of rights over a 
thing affects its prospects of care; it can either enhance the sustainability of 
resources, or may expose them to depletion and degradation. In those 
circumstances when the level of care a given thing receives is the least possible, 
the prospect for those resources may be depletion.
The underlying idea is that when something is under the control of the largest 
number of people, it becomes difficult to provide the maximum possible care 
that thing deserves. This idea implies that holding a thing in common is not by 
itself problematic; the crisis is most likely experience when a large number of 
people enjoy a common right over a thing. The contrary reading of Aristotle’s 
premise implies that the care level of something is the maximum possible when 
the number of persons with property rights over the thing is small.
In terms of environmental resources, ‘...the creation or recognition of 
property rights’ is considered as the scheme that remedies the problems of the 
commons.11 Vesting property rights prerogatives on individuals or communities 
has been assumed to halt the short-term economic gain that can devastate the 
long-term benefits of resources.12 Once the government creates or recognizes 
property rights over something then it leaves it for the market, with the 
assumption that no one would act against his or her own self-interest.13 In 
contrast to something held in common by a large number, private property rights 
provide an incentive that encourages an owner to value and manage the 
resources for his long-term benefits. For instance, Carol contends that ‘exclusive 
private property is thought to foster the well-being of the community, giving its
312_________________ Mizan Law Review_______________ Vol. 7 No.2, December 2013
9 Michael Taylor (1992). ‘The Economics and Politics of Property Rights and Common 
Pool Resources’, Natural Resources Journal 32; p 3 see also Dasgupta, Partha (1982). 
The Control of Resources , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press , p.13.
‘Politica’, trans. B. Jowett, in Richard Mckenon (ed.) The Basic Works of Aristotle 
(New York: Random House, 1941), pp.1113-1316.
11 Salzman and Thompson, supra note 1, p.47-48.
12 Id., p.48.
13 Ibid.
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members a medium in which resources are used, conserved and exchanged to 
their greatest advantage’.14
One of the important differences between ordinary common rights and public 
property is the amount of people who enjoy the thing in question. In many cases, 
in ordinary commons, the number of persons with common rights may be too 
small, whereas, in public, it is too large.15 Since a large number of users are 
involved, the care bestowed to the resources is the least possible, unless there 
are schemes to regulate users’ behaviour. However, in those contexts where 
something is owned by a small or large group as co-owners, there has been care 
for the resources, since a group of people introducing self-regulation or a level 
of resources use is determined by a government’s rules to ensure the 
sustainability of the resources.16 The co-owning group excludes others from 
intervention, which adversely affects their interest.17 In the case of public 
property rights, most of the time, a given thing is held in common by the largest 
number of people, and the government has the authority to control access and 
the extent of use in order to protect the common interest.18 Noticeably, users of 
the commons are expected to abide by the rules that impose duty.19
1.3 Unregulated commons
Hardin noted that if the commons are left unregulated, the extent of exploitation 
relies on the judgment of the users themselves, and he doubts that individual 
rational users would work to sustain the long-term interests of the common 
users. Apparently, those individuals who exploit the commons excessively 
would leave fewer resources for those users who commit themselves. In the 
absence of any rules restricting the access and extent of use, such resources 
become open-access resources.
Ultimately, such exploitation of resources would lead the commons to a 
tragedy that might even lead the resources to the extent of extinction. For such 
adverse consequences, Hardin’s theory criticizes the political-economic model
14 Carol M. Rose (1986). ‘The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom, and 
Inherently Public Property’, Faculty Scholarship Series. Paper 1828. Available 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1828, last accessed 05 august 2013
15 Daniel H. Cole ( 2002). Pollution & Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for 
Environmental Protection, Cambridge University press, p. 11.
16 Carl Dahlman (1980). The Open Field System and Beyond: Property Rights Analysis 
of an Economic Institution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 26, 132
7 Daniel Bromley W. (1991). Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public 
Policy, Oxford,: Basil Blackwell, pp. 25-6.
18 Daniel H. Cole (2002). Pollution & Property: Comparing Ownership Institutions for 
Environmental Protection, Cambridge University press, pp 7-8.
19 Ibid.
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of leaving the resources as open-access. As a root cause of environmental 
challenges, the tragedy of the commons considers the absence of regulatory 
rules of the commons users’ behaviour.20 It assumes not only that the commons 
is a natural resource held in common by many individuals, but also that the 
access and extent of the exploitation of resources is unregulated.21The incentive 
is created since the cost of the exploitation of resources is externalized and is 
borne by the public at large, whilst rational individual users are maximizing 
short-term economic gain with no cost to pay.22
Hardin illustrated this problem by using open-access pastureland. With open- 
access pastureland, each rational herdsman makes an effort to maximize the 
gains from his or her herding in a plot of land.23 In such situations, Hardin 
believed that a rational herdsman would receive most pasturelands benefits by 
adding more and more herds, whilst at the same time; these practices would lead 
the natural resources to ruin.
The tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a pasture open to 
all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as 
possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably 
satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep 
the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the 
land. Finally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when the 
long-desired goal of social stability becomes a reality. At this point, the 
inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates tragedy.24
The tragedy of the commons theory stresses that natural resources experience 
possible threats to their sustainability if they are left unregulated.25 It is believed 
that, in ‘open access’, any user or group of users is unable to limit access and 
unwise use the commons.26 The users’ behaviour is uncontrolled, in terms of 
protecting common interests and environmental sustainability;27 they are free to 
use the resources to the extent of their need. The fear for such resources is, 
without rules or limitations, people act less responsibly.28 The openness (non­
20 Eban Goodstein (1995). ‘The Economic Roots of Environmental Decline: Property 
Rights or Path Dependence?’, Journal of Economic Issues 62, p. 1029.
1 Salzman and Thompson, Supra note 1,.pp. 19, 47.
22 Ibid, pp.20-21.
23 Hardin, supra note 2, pp. 1243-1248.
24 Ibid.
25 Hardin , supra note 2, p. 1243.
6 Cole, supra note 18, p. 6.
7 Bonnie J. McCay (2009). Right to Nature: Ecological, Economic, Cultural, and 
Political Principles of Institutions for the Environment ( Editors: Hanna, S., Carl 
Follke, F. and Makler, K. Island Press, Washington), p. 115.
28 Ibid.
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restriction) of the access and use of the resources facilitates those resources’ 
ruin. As the incentives to exploit the use of resources increase, the users are 
encouraged to exploit the unregulated resources more and more.29 Eventually, 
all users may resort to exploiting as their capacities allow, rather than reasonable 
use from what is available and from what the carrying capacity of the resources 
permits. ‘Freedom in a common brings ruin to all.’30
The milestone underlining the tragedy of the commons is that if a resource is 
held in common by a large number of people, for use by all without limitation of 
access and use, and owned by no person or group, no one may wish to behave 
and use the resources in a manner that sustains the resources for long-term 
common use. The users exploit resources in a way that promotes short-term self­
benefits while ignoring or undermining the long-term benefits. In such a 
situation, ‘[t]he result is individually rational in the short term - if the resource 
will be depleted, you might as well ensure you get your share -but collectively 
disastrous in the long term.’31The openness of the commons develops a dilemma 
for the commons use. This dilemma is described as ‘...individually rational 
behaviour is collectively deficient. Individuals’ personal incentives work 
against the best long-term solution.’32 Due to this, the commons held through 
public property may require more regulatory and non-regulatory schemes to 
enhance the sustainability of resources.
2. Averting the Tragedy
Identifying the conditions that lead to a ruin does not assure sustainability of the 
commons. It needs to find out mechanisms that can facilitate sustainable 
resources usage. The tragedy of the commons gives insight as to how to prevent 
the open access scarce resources from generating ruin for all.33 The theory has 
identified two alternative solutions: the commons to be appropriated when such 
measure is possible, or be regulated by coercive rules if appropriation is 
impossible. Both remedies suggest defining institutional arrangements limiting 
access and use of the commons towards controlling the overuse of natural 
resources.
2.1 Appropriation of the open-access resource
The market-oriented remedy for the tragedy of the commons theory suggests 
that, if appropriation is possible, a government can establish rules assigning
29 Ibid, pp. 19, 47.
30 Hardin, supra note 2.
1 Salzman and Thompson, supra note 1, p.20.
32 Ibid.
33 Hardin , supra note 2, pp. 1243-1248.
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private property rights over scarce open-access resources; then, each resources 
owner uses natural resources in a way that is sustainable. The implication is that 
a ‘rational individual’ does not cause his or her own resources to be ruined by 
his or her own actions. Hardin’s argument, suggesting appropriation of natural 
resources, supports privatization to regulate users’ behaviour. Privatization of 
the commons assumes the owners defend abuse of the natural resources through 
property law. The assumptions are that publicly owned sectors are exposed to 
inefficient performance, are subject to ‘state failure’, and portray market forces 
as better devices to enhance economic efficiency.34
However, the market itself is naturally exposed to failure.35 This 
demonstrates that free market is not a panacea for social, environmental and 
economic problems.36 For instance, Peritz defined the term ‘competition’ as ‘a 
process whereby firms fight against each other in order to secure customers for 
their products by adopting any means’.37 He further described free competition 
as ‘the most certain way of fixing the true worth of merchandise between buyers 
and sellers’.38 The restraint or absence of a choice in any market affects 
competition.39 Accordingly, the notion of competition itself is a mediating force 
that balances interests. Here, for competition to happen there must be 
competitors who compete in the same market to obtain maximum profits, and 
consumers who have choices of a specific service or product.40
Simply put, if efficient regulatory schemes are not in place, ‘state failure’ in 
the case of public control is replaced by ‘market failure’ in the case of private 
control. The essence of this idea is that privatization itself does not bring about 
competition if there are no possible competitors. Even in markets with many 
choices, leaving the market alone to its own devices (demand and supply) may 
give rise to unwanted outcomes.41 Potentially, in an unregulated market, firms
34 UNCTAD Model Law, (2001b). The relationship between competition authorities 
and regulatory bodies, pp.12-18.
35 Michal S. Gal (2004). The Ecology of Antitrust Preconditions for Competition Law 
Enforcement in Developing Countries, New York University School of law, pp. 22-38
36 Erik Swyngedouw, (2005). ‘Dispossession H20 : the contested terrain of water 
privatisation’, Capitalism Nature Socialism, 16(1), p. 82.
37 CUTS (2001). Competition Policy and Law Made Easy’ Monographs on Investment 
and Competition Policy, pp. 6-8.
38 Rudolph Peritz (1996). Competition Policy in America, (Oxford University press),
p.1.
38 Ibid. pp. 2-3.
39 OECED (2000). Hard Core Cartels, Meeting of the OECD Council at Ministerial 
Level, pp. 12-13
40 Ibid.
41 Gal, supra note 35, pp.22-38.
The Myth of ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ in Sustaining Water Resources 317
may tend to impose restrictions that are anti-competitive practices by their 
nature. In such situations, it is often said that the government monopoly may 
have been replaced by a private monopoly, leading to ‘market failure’.42
2.2 Restraint by coercive rules developed through outside agents
In cases where appropriation is impossible, the tragedy of the commons suggests 
the regulated access and use of commons. These rules involve ‘Mutual Coercion 
Mutually Agreed Upon’.43 Hardin believed that it might not be possible to limit 
the tragedy of commons through a mere ‘verbal appeal’. The theory 
recommends the introduction of coercive rules that limit selfish individuals or 
groups. As a society, the users need to change their behavior towards the over­
exploitation of the commons. To avert the tragedy of the commons, in addition 
to the creation or recognition of property rights, a range of regulatory and non­
regulatory schemes have been developed.44 One of these regulatory 
arrangements is prescriptive (coercive) regulation. In prescriptive regulation, the 
government may limit access or the extent of the exploitation of resources.45 The 
rules limit the particular types of natural resources usage that a government 
considers unsustainable, and declares some resources uses are permitted. 
Through this, access to and exploitation of some natural resources are limited or 
stopped.
The Coercive rules are generally developed and administered by outside 
agents. It favors direct top-down natural resources management. This type of 
regulatory instrument is often considered as command-and-control regulation by 
a government agency, and it is doubtful that it brings about an effective change 
in the level of resources exploitation.46 Once the users have attained the relevant 
level of limitation to access or use of the commons, the rule does not offer 
incentives to encourage further innovation that enhances sustainable resources 
use.47 Due to this, the users may continue to rely on traditional and non­
innovative regulatory mechanisms. However, some scholars argue that strict 
prescriptive regulation increases sustainable use through encouraging the 
production process and innovation designs.48
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
Ibid.
Hardin, supra note 2, p.124.
Salzman and Thompson, supra note 1, p.47.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Porter &Van der Linde (1997). ‘Towards a New Conception of the Environment- 
Competiveness Relationship’, 9 Journal of Economic Perspectives 97 , Issue 4, pp.
47-52.
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Another regulatory means is financial penalties or charges that internalize the 
cost. This regulatory approach discourages unsustainable resource use through 
imposing fees.49 It aims to provide incentives for each user to shape his or her 
behavior. A practical problem for introducing this scheme is identifying the 
appropriate fee, which accommodates the full social and environmental cost, 
since the valuation of the right fee is difficult.50 Naturally, introducing and 
implementing the correct internalization of the social and environmental cost is 
increasingly dependent on the political willingness of a given country. For such 
a scheme to be effective, the fees should be high enough to send price signals 
toward sustainable resources use; however, environmental goods charges often 
tend more towards revenue-raising.51 in contrast to financial penalties, financial 
payments could subsidize those people who use the resources in a beneficial 
way, in order to encourage sustainable resources use.52 Both regulation and 
market instruments are designed to discourage harmful social behavior and 
encourage beneficial behavior. In this case, the government does not impose 
penalties or charges; instead, it subsidizes them.
3. Drawbacks of the Tragedy of the Commons
when Hardin demonstrated what he called the tragedy of the commons on 
pastureland, it was not about a ‘common’, which is owned by a group of users 
who own a thing collectively and restrict other users coming from outside a 
group, but it was about open-access resources. Hardin using the term 
‘commons’ whilst describing ‘open-access’ or ‘unregulated’ resources has been 
seen as a misconception.53 Stevenson noted that common property is not open 
access; the group has rights and duties to limit access and the extent of 
exploitation of resources.54 Since such property has defined rights and duties 
upon group users and outsiders, the commons closely resembles private 
property, which gives the owner the right to exclude others’ exploitation without 
his/her consent.55
Similarly, Dahlman contends that the commons has been regulated by quasi- 
go'vernmental or governmental rules.56 The access and use of the resources
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
Ibid, p.50.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Taylor, supra note 9.
Glenn Stevenson (1991). Common Property Economics: A General Theory and Land 
Use Applications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 58-9.
Ibid.
Salzman and Thompson, supra note 1, p. 21.
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within a group are limited.57For instance, in England, common pastureland has 
persisted for centuries.58 Such pasturelands were not open-access in their nature; 
instead, they were owned by a defined group that excluded any other group from 
intervention in the property rights they had. Often, the village court, the 
government or a quasi-government regulated their exploitation.59 Similarly, 
Turkish fisheries have been governed through common property rights, and this 
system has persisted for a long period of time.60 The fishers themselves have 
developed rules governing the extent of exploitation, to avert possible 
depletion.61 The government has also developed regulatory rules limiting 
fishers.62
On the other hand, Bromley contends that ‘a common property regime for the 
group becomes an open access regime for the individuals within the group.’63 
There are no rules limiting individual group members from access and use of the 
resources. However, practice indicates that the traditional common does not 
entitle the group to exploit the resources without restriction.64 Their exploitation 
levels are limited by rules developed by themselves or the government.65 The 
members in common pool resource cannot exclude its group’s members; they 
exclude non-group members from access and use.66 The main confusion 
regarding the tragedy of the commons may stem from confusing ordinary 
commons or common pool resources with open-access resources. With the 
ordinary commons, individual owners can have a range of prerogatives to 
control access and the extent of exploitation to make the resources sustainable. 
There are schemes that exclude users outside the group and regulate resources 
use within the group.67
Elinor Ostrom observed the commons from the perspective of real-world 
contexts, by carrying out empirical research on communal resources, such as 
fisheries, land irrigation systems and farmland. She considered open-access
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58 Id., pp. 33-36.
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61
62
63
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66
Id., p. 126.
Fikret Berkes (1992). ‘Success and Failure in Marine Costal Fisheries of Turkey’, in 
Daniel W. Bromely (ed.), Making the Commons Work, San Francisco: Institute for 
Contemporary Studies, p. 167.
Ibid.
Id, p. 168
Daniel W. Bromley (1991). Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public 
Policy, Oxford,: Basil Blackwell, p. 149.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Id, pp. 25-6.
67 Taylor, supra note 9, pp. 6- 8.
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resources and common pool resources as two different concepts. With open- 
accesses resources, she believed that there is no limit to the access of resources, 
and it is impossible to identify who the users are.68 Open-access resources are 
characterized as those resources that are free to all users. She described common 
pool resources as large enough, and difficult to define who the users are, but it is 
not impossible to identify them.69 Hardin’s explanation of pastureland usage 
suggests that the word ‘commons’ refers to ‘open-access ‘resources, in which no 
individual has a claim to any part of the resources used by another user; the 
commons nature of resources allows the use of a portion of it for his/her own 
benefit, without any limitation from other users. For example, resources like the 
open sea and the atmosphere are classified as open-access resources, whereas 
rivers and lakes are categorized as common pool resources.70
The second criticism against Hardin’s theory was related to the decision­
making institutional arrangements and organizational structures that he proposed 
to avert the tragedy of the commons. Ostrom argued that, with common pool 
resources, users have their own rules, developed to utilize the resources and 
limit outsiders. The tragedy of the commons also does not suggest a 
management role for the users of scarce common resources. it is very vague as 
to what organizational remit is appropriate for enhancing the security of water 
and it is unclear which level of government that would be mandated to provide 
regulatory rules. Moreover, it seems to fail to recommend options for coercive 
rules.
Hardin’s assumptions and the solutions he suggested fail to consider the 
community as part of the management to supplement the coercive regulatory 
arrangements, but the theory finally fails to demonstrate the practical and 
theoretical relevance of community management. Ostrom suggested an idea that 
recognizes, under certain circumstances, the possibility of managing natural 
resources by the community itself. She underlines the fact that, in some 
circumstances, community users formulate the rules that regulate common pool 
resources and enforce them without any government intervention.71 Her work 
brings a self-governance system at the centre of sustaining scarce natural 
resources in defined circumstances.
68 Elinor Ostrom (2008). ‘The Challenges of Common-pool Resources’, Environment: 
Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 50:4, p. 11.
9 Elinor Ostrom (1990). Governing the Commons: the Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action (New York, Cambridge University Press), pp. 90-105.
70 Ostrom and Hess (2001). Artifacts, Facilities and Content: Information as a 
Common Pool Resource, Conference on Public Domain, Duke Law School, 
November , pp. 9-11.
71 Ostrom, supra note 69, pp. 90-105.
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However, Ostrom described the following circumstances that should shape 
common pool resources management.72 Primarily, the resources’ boundaries 
should be defined, and the users’ rights be clearly identified. Moreover, there 
must be established rules specifying the amount of resources that each user is 
entitled to exploit from the common pool of resources. The third aspect 
concerns collective choice arrangements. Many of the individuals who are 
affected by the utilization and protection of the resources should become 
involved in the group that makes or modifies the rules that govern collective 
action. The fourth aspect suggests that there must be close monitoring of the 
behaviour of users. This can be done by a body that is at least partially 
accountable to the users, or can involve the users themselves. The fifth idea 
involves imposing a graduated sanction on the wrongdoer, based on the context 
and nature of seriousness. The users or officials accountable to them, or both, 
can impose this sanction.
Another aspect is that there should be a low-cost conflict resolution system 
that resolves conflict between users, or between users and the officials managing 
the resources. Furthermore, there is the idea that users are not restricted to 
having their own institutions to manage resources by the government 
authorities. There must be a minimum standard that entitles the users to organize 
how they manage their resources. At the same time, they must be given long­
term access to the resources. The final aspect is the introduction of multilayer 
governance for the appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, and 
conflict resolution and governance activities.
Hardin’s theory called for the intervention of increased government agencies 
rather than participatory management through developing self-rules. However, 
the local users are not the only cause of the tragedy of the commons; rather they 
come up with solutions that are supportive in sustaining the commons. With 
regard to this, Ostrom demonstrated the possibility of the introduction of 
cooperative arrangements for the commons through collective agreement on 
how to exploit the resources sustainably.73
The commons in the tragedy of the commons demonstrate that resources are 
kept open-access for a larger number of individuals. As the numbers of the 
commons users are too many, it becomes increasingly difficult to adopt such a 
cooperative system and limit free riders. Often, the transaction costs are too high 
both to reach an agreement and to implement it.74 This collective action problem 
may limit introducing a self-governance system in water resources management.
Ostrom’s practical evidence has shown the existence of long-lived irrigation 
communities that have been stable due to the decision-making of the users’
72 Ibid.
73 Salzman and Thompson, supra notel, p.19.
74 Ibid.
community.75 However, Ostrom did not entirely rule out or disagree with 
Hardin’s theory, nor did she disagree in principle with the inevitability of the 
tragedy of commons in the absence of an institutional arrangement regulating 
the behaviour of users, or in situations where common pool resources 
management systems are weak or impractical.76 She maintains the optimality of 
the use of privatization and coercive rules as devices in different circumstances. 
The common pool resources theory only works in exceptional circumstances, 
depending on the context of resources and the behaviour of the users.
What Ostrom totally rejected was the limited choices of decision-making 
within the institutional arrangements that the tragedy of commons theory 
proposes, and the way that ‘commons’ was conceptualized. She underlined that 
the government and market alone are not solutions to the threats of natural 
resources pressures. Her ideas were subsequently reinforced by Bosselman, who 
noted that a common pool resource is not a resource that is available to anyone 
to exploit. Rather, it is regulated by community norms as to how it is used and 
who participates in the utilization and protection of the resource.77
Another study conducted by Ostrom, in collaboration with other scholars, 
suggests that there is no single institutional arrangement that averts the 
challenges of water resources security. Rather, ‘the best system of control is 
one, which meets the most critical challenges of the situation at hand’.78 They 
suggested that the reason why a ‘control system sometimes succeeds and 
sometimes fails is that the challenges of resources management vary with 
resource; characteristics of the resource users; and the environmental, social, 
economic, and political context of resource use - most of which change over 
time’.79 This study further suggests that water resources management should be 
context-specific, changing with the factors that shape the contexts, and flexible 
enough to accommodate those changes.
More empirical research conducted by Ostrom concerning common-pool 
resources shows that the status of some common pool resources are, at present, 
better in some areas while the scenario is different in other parts of the world.80
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The cause for mixed outcomes in common pool resources management is the 
existence of variation in the contexts.81 She suggested that the institutional 
arrangements regarding natural resources require updating regularly in the light 
of information and experience gained.82 They should be framed as change- 
responsive.83 This new orientation in common pool resources discloses the 
necessity of modifying institutional arrangements in relation to the dynamics of 
the context. She also noted the fact that common pool resources management 
should take into account the interests of users and provide a conflict resolution 
mechanism.84
In this study, she reinforced the idea that common pool resource management 
varies according to the scope of the area it covers, the number of users, and the 
nature of exploitation. She concluded that there is no particular ideal common 
pool resource management scheme; rather, it varies with the context.85 She went 
on to argue that common pool resources may be governed through various 
institutional arrangements, but she grouped these institutional arrangements 
roughly into three: governmental, private and communal institutional 
arrangements.86 These ranges of management institutions are not alternatives; 
they may only be effective if used with sufficient information regarding the 
context of the common pool resources problems. None of these policy options 
are free of the disadvantages incurred upon their use; it is wise to choose based 
on the circumstances in question. These institutional arrangements are not the 
best schemes in all contexts and at all times.
Whilst Ostrom places direct resource users at the centre of decision-making, 
the initial study of the common pool resource did not provide for the 
involvement of persons that have a stake in the specific natural resources other 
than direct users when the circumstances contended by Ostrom are met.87 
Accommodating the stakes of non-direct natural resources users is equally 
important in natural resources management, and this was undermined. In 
particular, in Ostrom’s early study of the common pool resource, the inclusion 
of the ‘outsiders’ community’s’ interests was unclear. The impression is that the
81
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decision-making in common pool resource was dominated by the users’ self­
governance system.88
In such situations, it is said that the selfish users may not see far beyond their 
self-interest.89 It is often said that such natural resources management is a 
constraint for economic development,90 and may undermine the equitable use of 
natural resources for present and future generations.91 92 The danger may be 
critical to ‘voiceless’ stakeholders that cannot protect their interests, such as the 
water environment.
Whilst Hardin is correct in observing that the destiny of unregulated scarce 
resources is ruin and threats to the security of humans and the economy, the 
remedies he suggested fail to recognize the creditability of participatory natural 
resources management. The theory seems reluctant to consider local level 
empowerment in the management of scarce natural resources. Moreover, the 
theory relied purely on coercive rules, and neglected the benefits of non­
coercive models of natural resources management. For Hardin, the users of 
commons are the threat to resources conservation. Natural resources, including 
water resources, need social learning, which involves the stakeholder in natural 
resources management.93 Hardin’s suggestion tends to favour a more centralized 
than polycentric decision-making process in water resources management.94
In the tragedy of the commons theory, issues such as distributional equity, 
community welfare and other social and cultural benefits are undermined.95 
Naturally, environmental concerns are too important to be left solely to the 
regulators. The involvement of the local citizens is crucial to protect the 
environment. The common users may change their behavior towards sustainable 
resources use or combat against unsustainable resource exploitation by others 
when they realize that unsustainable resource exploitation is already happening 
- or is about to start happening. In addition to such hard rules and market 
instruments, persuasion is a soft approach to force users to change their
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behaviour.96 To this end, governments engage in a range of activities that inform 
the danger and create awareness of unsuitable resources exploitation, and 
educate the users by showing the causes and possible dangers of the over-use of 
resources.97
The tragedy of the commons may be addressed more effectively through an 
adaptive governance system that takes into account specific contexts, rather than 
privatization or government regulation.98 In addition, natural resources have 
been best governed and sustained for centuries through informal institutions, 
rather than the formal institutions that Hardin prescribed.99 However, this is not 
to generalize that traditional institutions are the best fit in all places and 
contexts; depending on the nature of the problems, the contexts of the natural 
resources and the behaviour of the users, their level of effectiveness varies.
For instance, transcending water pollution problems, climate change and 
related challenges that are exacerbating the scarcity of natural resources may not 
be effectively managed through traditional institutional arrangements alone, 
although they have yet to supplement formal institutional arrangements.100 
Many challenges to the availability of water resources are local by their natures, 
but their impacts are transcending. Naturally, such challenges may require 
complex, polycentric and more comprehensive institutional arrangements than 
localized, fragmented or centralized arrangements.
The tragedy of the commons did not envisage the contribution of weak and 
ineffective institutional arrangements in the increasing insecurity of the 
sustainability of natural resources. Rather, Hardin focused on the absence of 
institutional arrangements. He noted that unregulated scarce natural resources 
are vulnerable to ruin, but over-simplified the possible solutions, suggesting 
privatization or government regulation.101
Moreover, in its initial stage, the common pool resource theory did not place 
due focus on how to manage the impact of one natural resource utilization on 
the adjacent water body. In real world, common pool resources do not exist in 
isolation; ecosystems are interconnected with their adjacent ecosystems. 
Pressures on the given land resources affect the uses and protection of adjacent 
water resources. The problems of unwise exploitation of land resources may not 
be limited to those resources or users. However, the early orientation of the 
theory indicates that the theory did not give adequate place for regulating a
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range of factors, which may contribute for the threat of natural resources 
scarcity except demand management.
4. Some Issues in the Applicability of the Tragedy of the 
Commons for Water Security Management
4.1 Water security conceptualization
water security may be seen as a catch-box, which brings a range of threats 
under scrutiny. For instance, the UN Human Development Report 2006 
describes water security as ‘...ensuring that every person has reliable access to 
enough safe water at affordable prices to lead a healthy, dignified and 
productive life, while maintaining the ecological systems that provide water and 
also depend on it’.102 Similarly, Garay and Sadoff defined water security as an 
‘...acceptable quantity and quality of water for health, livelihoods, ecosystems 
and production coupled with an acceptable level of water-related risk to people, 
environment and economics’.103
The notion of ‘water security’ encompasses sustainable availability of 
adequate quality water.104 Water resources experience water security threats 
when they become inaccessible or unsuitable for satisfying the needs of humans 
and the ecosystem.105 When conducting an assessment of the notion water 
security, it is necessary to investigate, ‘whether or not adequate quality water is 
available for use, and whether individuals and ecosystems have access to 
adequate water’.106 The quantity of available water alone does not guarantee 
water security. Rather, the available water must be of acceptable quality state to 
meet a range of needs. inadequate quality or quantity of water means that the 
security of people and ecosystems is under threat. Then there must be 
responsive and comprehensive institutional arrangements that control factors 
contributing for water insecurity at different levels.
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4.2 The degree of availability of adequate safe water
The earth is covered by around 1.4 billion km3 of water in volume and, from this 
figure, fresh water constitutes only 2.5 per cent.107 Around 97 per cent of the 
earth’s water resources are salty water, which cannot be accessible without the 
process of desalination being carried out. Fresh water comprises a small portion 
of the earth's water, but its state of accessibility is constrained by the nature of 
its existence. Only 0.3 per cent of fresh water exists in lakes and rivers that are 
relatively easily available for human use.108 * Of the remaining fresh water, 30 per 
cent is ground water, while 70 per cent is situated within ice and snow cover in 
mountainous areas.
Freshwater resources are not evenly distributed by place.110 The availability 
of safe water resources varies regionally, seasonally and annually.111 Periodic 
available water variation affects the availability of suitable water supplies.112 
Some geographical areas are humid, while others are semi-arid or arid; and even 
in humid zones water availability varies by place and time.
Analyzing the over-grazing of the pastureland by the commons, Hardin’s 
commons theory widely focuses on demand regulation rather than the 
multifaceted, present-day water resources challenges. It seems that Hardin did 
not appreciate the challenges to water security that happen due to natural water 
scarcity. As has been discussed elsewhere, natural cause is one of the threats to 
water security.113 Due to this, natural water scarcity challenges barely obtained 
recognition as contributing to water security challenges. The theory also fails to 
propose aspects relating to water supply management. Practically, it may not be 
possible to provide a proper solution to natural water security challenges by 
opting to manage water demand alone at all times and places.
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On the other hand, human-induced pressures also threaten the availability of 
freshwater resources.114 Water resources are wasted, polluted and mismanaged 
by users in a way that is unsustainable.115 In particular, when the available water 
resources are becoming scarce, human-induced pressures exacerbate the 
challenges to water security.116 As a result, the human-induced pressures reduce 
water security.117 Although the precise impacts of climate change will be varied 
around the world, it is predicted that climate change may cause greater 
uncertainty in rainfall patterns. As a result, availability of water resources is 
likely to change significantly. Temperatures rising by 2 to 3°C due to climate 
change would expose between 1.1 and 3.2 billion people to water scarcity 
problems.118 With increasing climate change challenges,
‘[t]he greatest vulnerabilities are likely to be in unmanaged water systems 
and systems that are currently stressed and unsustainably managed due to 
policies that discourage efficient water use and protection of water quality, 
inadequate watershed management, failure to manage variable water supply 
and demand...’119 ‘In unmanaged systems there are few or no structures in 
place to buffer the effects of hydrological variability on water quality and 
supply.’120 ‘Similarly, in unsustainably managed systems, water and land 
use can add stresses that heighten vulnerability to climate change.’121
In unmanaged or poorly managed water bodies, unsustainable water exploitation, 
unsustainable watershed exploitation and other environmental pressures bring 
water resources to the brink of depletion. Increased pressures in water resources
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result in increased vulnerability, whereas introducing many institutional 
arrangements that reduce the pressures will lessen this vulnerability.122 This 
challenge is likely to exacerbate with increasing population growth.123 This 
demonstrates that more safeguard measures may be needed to enhance water 
security by reducing human pressures.
4.3 Global trends of water resources scarcity
Globally, water scarcity has already threatened the earth.124 In many parts of the 
world, the challenges to the security of water resources are expected to become 
critical.125 The global water shortage map, which was published by Nature in 
September 2010, predicts that, by 2050, nearly 80% of the world’s population 
will be exposed to high levels of water security threat.126 Water security 
challenge continues to rise across the globe.127
Conventionally water scarcity was understood from semi-arid and arid 
countries perspectives. However, now, there are water security problems in both 
dry and wet countries.128 Water security challenges are matters which are of 
wide geographical concern and extend well beyond the arid countries that have 
previously been seen as most vulnerable to threats of water insecurity.’129 Water 
scarcity and drought affect both developed and developing countries, but the 
impacts are more damaging to economically developing countries130 which are 
already experiencing water security problems.131 Even in poor countries, the
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impacts of the problems in water security are likely to be high on the people 
‘such as small farmers, agricultural labourers and pastoralists’.132
4.4 Water as public good
As water resources are movable, it is too difficult to apply the traditional 
concepts of property ownership.133 Geches noted that ‘[w]ater is legally and 
historically a public resource. Although private property rights can be perfected 
in the use of water, it remains essentially public; private rights are always 
incomplete and subject to the public’s common needs.’134 In France, for 
instance, the Institutes of Justinian declared running water among things that 
could not be owned privately or by a few commons, although it recognized the 
private right to use them in a restricted fashion.135 Similarly, in the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Justice Holmes noted that ‘A river is more than an 
amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among 
those who have power over it. ’136
Across the globe, public/state control of the water resources in a natural 
water body is common, where the largest number of people enjoy public rights 
whilst many individual users enjoy private rights, which entrusts the right to the 
use of the resources. The beneficiaries do not possess property rights like 
ordinary thing. In the United States, the federal government regulates the use of 
rivers and lakes, and controls waste disposal to ensure that waterways remain 
navigable.137 Water resources have been seen as the ‘public property of the 
nation’.138 In the United Kingdom, navigable water resources are public 
property.139
Similarly, in Ethiopia, all natural resources, including water resources, are 
public property; the ownership is vested upon the state and the people of 
Ethiopia.140 This type of property right is not a private or ordinary common right
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which confers ownership to a person or specific group of people with restriction 
against outsiders to use and develop a resource. Accordingly, in Ethiopia, the 
federal government is empowered to regulate the use of water resources across 
the country.141 Under public ownership of water resources, public property 
rights are imposed against water resources users.142 This duty affects how water 
resources are exploited.143
4.5 Water utilities privatization
Many environmental resources are not commoditized as ordinary resources. 
Privatization may not be seen as the right solution for those resources that are 
widely public in their nature, such as watersheds.144 It is also impractical to 
allocate them in a proper sense, and allocation through creating private rights 
may favour some users and disfavour others.145 It is contended that ‘many things 
by law excepted from the ordinary rules of appropriation are reserved for the use 
of public’.146 Due to these special characteristics a significant public intervention 
in resources such as freshwater is inevitable.147
In England, for instance, the privatization of the water utilities was a highly 
debated subject. There are arguments both for privatization and against it.148 The 
opponents of privatization justify their resistance on the grounds of social 
equity. They contend that when control of the water services is transferred to the 
private sector, water users are seen as customers rather than citizens.149 
Normally, private companies work to maximize profit rather than to serve 
societal interests. They are answerable to the shareholders. In the fully 
privatized water sector, access to water resources is dependent on the 
‘willingness to pay’, rather than enhancing access to water, particularly for those 
people who cannot afford to pay. The opponents to the privatization of water 
utilities doubt that the market creates economic efficiency, since water is 
naturally scarce, leading to a natural monopoly. Water privatization is 
considered to be simply replacing the state monopoly with a private monopoly,
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unless mechanisms are put in place to control the behaviour of private water 
utilities.150
If water resources are a pure commodity, their abstraction depends upon the 
capacity to abstract, and the water service payments would depend on the 
willingness to pay. The private water industry may not want to manage demand, 
so to reduce the demand would increase the cost of the water supply, thus 
reducing revenue.151 As water is exposed to ‘state failure’, it is also exposed to 
‘market failure’.152 Neither water privatization nor public control is a panacea to 
sustain water resources. in such contexts, the key concerns involve the manner 
in which these polarities can be harmonized by striking a balance to ensure the 
security of water resources in both public and private water services companies.
4.6. Participation
Hardin’s assumptions and the solutions he suggested failed to favor inclusive 
management model, taking the community as part of the commons management 
to supplement coercive rules. Naturally, water resources problems are 
complex,153 users are diverse,154 the dynamics of water resources are 
uncertain,155 the ecosystem is interconnected, and sources of water resources 
problems are not specific; therefore, providing one solution may not solve all 
ongoing water resources problems.156 Natural resources management is not 
merely an economical or environmental construct; rather, it is a social, 
environmental and economic construct.157 Upon water resources use and 
development, a given country needs to consider all possible consequences 
unsustainable resources exploitation. Specially, water resources security 
requires the governments that are committed to the objectives that address 
sustainable development.
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A government institution may not have all the necessary information and 
experts to manage natural resources.158 Sometimes, taking a given action may 
trigger other unexpected problems.159 Participants go through various 
experiences and find out information about water resources to uncover solutions 
for water resources problems.160 Thus, water resource problems may not find all 
their solutions from governments or single levels or institutions; rather, public 
and stakeholder participation is needed.161
It is often said participation enhances the inclusion of stakeholders’ needs 
and aspirations within water resources management policies, and facilitates 
implementation.162 Stakeholder participation is also characterized as: a platform 
used to weigh conflicting interests and decision-making through the broader 
consideration of water resources use; the protecting of social interests rather 
than individuals’ needs through balancing these interests; and used as a tool for 
conflict prevention and resolution among water resources users.163
In situations where the government is part of the problem of water resource 
unsustainable exploitation, participatory water resources management model is 
one of the key schemes to regulate government behaviors. It creates a forum that 
helps to discuss and provide solutions that can mitigate the interests of different 
people.164 Public and stakeholder involvement in decision-making enhances the 
validity and legitimacy of government decisions,165 limits the discretion of 
administrative authorities by giving the public and stakeholders the opportunity 
to exert their influence on public authorities to render negotiated or mitigated
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decisions,166 and enhances the public acceptance of decisions that are made by 
government authorities.167
The use of local knowledge is also assumed to be a tool that could enhance a 
more effective local steering by reducing transaction costs, helping stakeholders 
to learn from their experiences, and using traditional knowledge for maximizing 
natural resource conservation efforts.168 Participatory decision-making promotes 
environmental justice and sustainable use of natural resources, as well as 
balancing the development and protection of natural resources.169 However, 
participatory water resource management is meaningful in an open government 
that gives legal remit for the stakeholders to influence government actions. 
Naturally, the level openness of a government is fully dependant on the overall 
democratic process and stage of democratization in one country. The democratic 
level that allows the extent of space to participate affects the status institutional 
arrangements toward the management of water resources.
For example, the European water Framework Directive (wFD) underlines 
that the success of sustainability of water resources depends on participatory 
decision-making.170 Under the European Water Framework Directive, each 
member state has an obligation to encourage the active involvement of all 
interested parties in the implementation of the Directive and the development of 
River Basin Management Plans.171 The involvement of stakeholders may start 
from initial planning to the overall implementation process. The level of their 
involvement is not limited and is at the discretion of member states. in the case 
of public participation, member states are obliged to ensure that competent 
bodies inform and consult the public, including water users, regarding the 
timetable and work programme for the production of river basin management 
plans and updates.172 To this end, each member state must publish and make 
available draft river basin plans and, before these are finalized, they are required 
to gain opinions and comments from the general public. This suggests that 
participatory resource management can be meaningful in the water resources 
governance only if governments release accurate, timely and usable information 
to the public.
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Public participation and stakeholder involvement in water resources may not 
be without drawbacks. The cost of participation is often regarded as 
disadvantageous. The people who have stakes in water use are too many; 
stakeholder participation demands a high cost if a stakeholder forum is actually 
needed to operate effectively, when compared with traditionally centralized 
schemes of natural resources management.173 The proper utilization of water 
resources may need relatively complex negotiation, which consumes time and 
money, in order for balanced solutions to be found. In particular, if countries are 
economically weak with chronic water scarcity, it is not easy in practice to 
change stakeholder participation in water resources management.
Obviously, competition between needs arises, and this makes it difficult for 
members of large groups to take part in the decision-making. This disadvantage 
may be managed through a representative mode of participation that involves 
some persons or groups who share interests, rather than involving the whole 
group.174 The problems with participatory decision-making may not end simply 
by using a representative mode of participation because there must be the right 
representation of stakeholders and fully vibrant participants.
It has been noticed that, in the context where the environment is voiceless, 
nature may be in peril and the interest of future generations’ may not be 
protected.175 The voiceless interests are ignored, and the outcome for the 
environment is precarious. Those short-sighted and self-interested users 
continue benefiting until the water resources are ruined. Moreover, participants 
in natural resources management may not be in equal positions to influence and 
provide fair and balanced decisions, as a result of which the dominant groups 
continue to generate their benefits through the disguise of participation.176
Furthermore, the selection process of participants may not be impartial, and 
the decision-making processes may allow some groups to impose their wishes 
on the other groups and public interests. Held states that ‘[i]t is not the single, 
isolated individual who is active in historical and political processes, but rather 
human beings who live in definite relations with others and whose nature is 
defined through these relations.’177 Naturally, such participatory decision­
making is neither negotiated nor democratic by its nature. Rather, it serves the
173 Sarah Hendry (2008). ‘River Basin Management and Water Framework Directive: 
in Need of a Little Help?’, 19 Water Law, p. 150.
174 Philppus Wester et al (2003). ‘Stakeholder Representation in the River Basin 
Management in Mexico and South Africa’, World Development 30(19), p. 797.
175 Stone, supra note 91, p. 172.
176 David Held (2006). Models of Democracy (3rd Polity Press, Cambridge ) p. 107
177 Ibid, p. 97.
interests of a few individuals at the expense of public interest.178 On the other 
hand, a completely decentralized participatory decision-making process is 
unorganized when it comes to protecting common interests.179 The danger of 
this type of decision-making may not differ too much from the tragedy of 
commons, which leads to uncontrolled resources being ruined by self-interested 
individuals.
5. Formal Rules toward the Control of Water Resources: 
Overview of Some Lessons from Europe’s Experience
When there are no proper rules regulating users’ behavior or implementation 
strategies, the exploitation of water resources as the commons is not free from 
the dilemma of individual water users. in particular, the water resources are 
exposed to the tragedy when water resources are unregulated in terms of over­
abstraction and water wastage. In addition, a lack of rules for water system 
management may expose water resources to ruin. Equally, the destruction of 
water systems and water pollution from both point and diffuse sources endanger 
the long-term availability of water. Open-access natural resources or resources 
that receive the least care will eventually become ruined.180
5.1 Water abstraction permits
Developing responsive permit systems for water abstraction may limit the over­
use of water as one of the tools to sustain water. For example, in England, the 
water abstraction permits were designed to protect the economic interests of 
permit holders through a ‘first come, first served’ principle.181 The water 
regime was designed when water resources in England were perceived to be in 
surplus, and the population number was considerably smaller.182 In England and 
Wales, at present, the Environment Agency nationally administers more than 
50,000 licenses that are obtained by different sectors.183 From this number, more 
than 80% of the permits are without a time-limit.184 These licences are not
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responsive to take immediate measures when availability is at risk unless 
compensation is paid for the permit owners or possessors.185 They grant a 
historic right to the permit owner or possessor. The system did not 
accommodate the contemporary pressing concerns of water shortage.186
The Water Act of 2003 has introduced time-bounded permit system.187 This 
new system requires permits to be issued on a time-limited basis and, starting 
from July 2012. In effect, the permit holders would no longer be entitled to 
claim compensation for any changes in their water abstraction permits under the 
circumstances determined by law.188 The introduction of the new water 
abstraction system has many implications. Firstly, it shows that despite water 
property rights of permit holders over the volumes of water, water permits need 
to be seen differently from other property rights. Secondly, national interests on 
water security prevail over the property rights of individual licence holders.
The new water regime provides abstraction permits which normally expire 
after 12 years from their issuance with a common ending date.189 The 
Environment Agency updates permit by considering the level of water resources 
in the catchment at any time.190 However, the Water Act of 2003 does not fully 
shape the old permit system automatically. Changing this traditional permit 
system is expected to be formulated in the 2020s.191 Until the 2020s, the Water 
White Paper promises to make better use of existing tools, and yet attempting to 
handle complex contemporary water resources problems.
5.2 Capacity to introduce regulatory tools
The tragedy of the commons does not demonstrate why the resources are open 
access and why there are no regulatory institutional arrangements. The 
discussion surrounding the tragedy of the commons demonstrates that averting 
the commons tragedy has been widely seen as needing the introduction of 
regulatory rules for the control of human behavior. It increasingly focuses on the
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non-availability of rules rather than the strength of existing rules to reshape the 
exploitation of unsustainable commons. Undoubtedly, the availability of rules 
regulating natural resources is decisive for the sustainability of the commons; 
however, this may not be a root cause. The economic development, the nature of 
the resources themselves and related factors matter in defining comprehensive 
rules and implementing them effectively.
A given country cannot introduce and implement the rules without costs.192 
in the member states of African Union, the introduction of water policies and 
laws has been growing over the last ten years. Many African countries have 
already introduced water policies and laws that encompass a range of water 
security management systems. However, the state of these developments varies 
considerably between African countries. Practice shows that, once African 
countries formulate water policies, it takes years to adopt an integrated water 
law that translates policy into practice.193
Even if many African countries have formulated water policies and law, the 
comprehensiveness of these instruments is dependent on the priority given to it 
by each country, and their strength and commitment to introducing proper 
institutional arrangements for water management. A recent empirical study of 
African water resources management indicated that the introduction of water 
policies and laws is not coherent between countries, and that implementation 
outcomes are too mixed.194 Some African countries have managed to develop 
them while others are at different stages due to various reasons.195 Many 
countries in Africa are still without ‘an operational water law’, and ‘in most 
countries the law is not yet fully implemented’.196
in many cases, lack of regulatory institutional arrangements and the capacity 
to implement them are root problems for natural resources degradation and 
unsustainable use. Within countries, the capacity to introduce such institutional 
arrangements and their implementation varies.197 In African countries, including 
Ethiopia, the capacity to develop institutional arrangements for water security is
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low compared with developed countries.198 The economic capacity and related 
problems adversely affect the pace and effectiveness of introducing institutional 
arrangements that avert the susceptibility of water resources to scarcity.199
The ultimate cause of environmental problems does not only stem from lack 
of regulatory institutional arrangements.200 Defining such arrangements is too 
costly.201 The challenge is the economic capacity to introduce effective 
institutional arrangements for water resources management and to develop 
strategies that facilitate implementation.202 This difference in capacity that 
affects water insecurity may be solved through developing integration among 
scales and effective cooperation within shared water resources. As water 
resources problems are shared problems for a range of scales, there should be 
schemes to harmonize policy and law. This does not rule out the necessity of 
effective regulatory arrangements at local and national levels; these attempts 
may not hold water unless there are strategies for effective implementation.
5.3 Water pricing
Institutional arrangements for water efficiency are considered as the primary 
focus for reducing water wastage leading to water security threats.203 Efficient 
water utilization makes a positive contribution towards enhancing water 
security.204 For efficient water utilization, water pricing is seen as a key 
economic regulatory scheme for incentivizing water users. The basic assumption 
of internalizing the water services costs is an economic premise that seeks to 
fully internalize prices of services and water resources in water pricing thereby 
pushing up prices as a result of which demand will go down. The more the cost 
of water increases, the more consumption drops since water is a price elastic 
economic good.205 Under-pricing will lead to the over-exploitation of water
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resources by failing to provide responsive incentive that shapes the behaviours 
of water users. It assists to control water consumption.
In water politics, internalizing the costs of water services and resources are 
disputed. Solanes notes that water is a special natural resource that makes it 
difficult for market forces such as demand and supply to regulate and allocate 
water for the users.208 Likewise, Bach considers water as a heritage which must 
be protected through internalizing the costs of water services.209 Such resistance 
to water cost internalization seems to emanate from the social dimension of 
water resources.
within the European Union, the introduction of water pricing scheme was 
highly debated and had faced resistance.210 Some countries have a long tradition 
of water pricing but other did not use it.211 For instance, in Ireland, domestic 
water supplies were free, and the water supplies costs were covered through 
taxation.212 Under the Water Framework Directive (WFD), member states are 
under an obligation to develop water pricing as a requirement.213 Although 
water pricing was controversial when the WFD was adopted in 2000, the 
Directive introduced a rule for water pricing. Member states have to ‘take 
account of the principle of recovery of costs of water services and ensures 
adequate contribution of water users to the cost of water as an economic 
regulatory tool.214 The member states oblige to internalize the costs of water 
services, including environmental and resource costs.215
Through the Water Framework Directive, the member states are expected to 
introduce water pricing policies that ‘provide adequate incentives’ for water 
consumers to use water efficiently.216 The idea of water pricing aims to realise 
the sustainability of water resources by providing incentives for water users that
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shape their behaviours and increase the appreciation of water use to enhance 
efficiency in water quality and quantity.217 However, in cost recovery, the WFD 
did not come with rules that support its effective applicability throughout EU 
member states. The aspiration of full cost recovery was, for example, watered 
down by a vague statement which reads: ‘to take into account the principle of 
recovery of cost’. This gives a wide room of discretion. As there is no common 
definition of water services, member states define it in their own way by flexibly 
narrowing down the concept.218 That means its implementation is dependent on 
the willingness of each member state.
The practice has shown that within the water bodies of the European Union, 
cost internalization is not materialized effectively.219 For the purpose of cost 
internalization, the scope of water services is often limited to drinking water and 
waste water treatment; this excludes regulation of major water consuming 
sectors, including water abstraction for agriculture.220 Amongst the types of 
water uses, on average, 44 % of total water abstraction in Europe is used for 
agriculture, 40 % for industry and energy production, and 15 % for public water 
supply.221
Drinking water demand is the lowest in water consumption when it is 
compared with other sectors. As an economic incentive, the scope of application 
of water pricing needs to accommodate the realm of non-drinking water, and
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needs to accommodate environmental and resources costs.222 With regard to 
water consumption by the agricultural sector in EU,
‘operational costs for the provision of water are only partly recovered for 10 
member states and capital costs are often subsidized. An important share of 
water abstractions for agriculture in the EU is not priced, even in water 
stress areas, and there is no financial mechanism for recovering the 
environmental and resource costs of individual abstractions or for giving 
incentives to using water more efficiently’.223
Although water services require the inclusion of environmental and resources 
costs, both are left unconsidered.224 in the Union, water pricing is not widely 
used and is hardly implemented beyond the sectors of drinking water supply and 
waste water treatment.225 Water cost internalization policies do not generally 
take into account the level of sensitivity of water security challenges.226 The 
Third Follow up Report to the Communication on water scarcity and droughts in 
the European Union indicated that many the European Union Member States 
including UK, the water-tariffs have been introduced recently or are under 
development in order to ensure water services cost recovery.227
The ‘right-price-tag’ on water services accommodates the full cost of water 
services.228 In England, water cost internalization is not effective since water 
metering is not a compulsory requirement except in the areas where resources 
are in stress.229 In many cases, in practice, regulatory rules for water resources 
do not accommodate compulsory rules obligating the installation of water 
meters for water used for a range of uses. Water prices are calculated at a flat- 
rate. In such circumstances, you are not expected to pay by the amount you use, 
and water bills hardly reflect the average price of water consumption.
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In developing countries, the capacity to introduce right rules for water cost 
internalization is low.230 Defining right institutional arrangements is too 
costly.231 In such counties, to internalize the cost of water services including 
environmental and resource costs may not be materialized without substantial 
assistance from developed countries.
5.4 Water leakage management
Another problem related to water efficiency is leakage management. For 
instance, water leakage problems within European Union member states vary 
between 7% to 70% or more.232 Although it may not be possible to avoid 
leakage altogether, introducing schemes that minimize water wastage within the 
European Union through leakages may contribute to reducing water security 
challenges. The idea of sustainable economic leakage levels is considered to 
benefit leakage problems within member states.233 In England, water leakage 
was one of the concerns in respect of water availability.
Grekos noted the water companies need to do more to reduce leakage and the 
companies should take is to make best use of existing resources.’234 For 
instance, in England, the UK Government has set out its water security 
aspirations for 2030 and some water companies have incorporated leakage 
reduction options to meet this target through their water resources management 
plans.235 Despite the benefits of this scheme within member states and water 
bodies, its implementation may not be realized without setting compliance 
mechanisms that regulate the efficiency of the infrastructures that are used in 
water development.
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5.5 Water system management
Water pollution increases the cost of water treatment and constrains the 
availability of water.236 Generally water pollution comes from two sources: 
point and diffuse sources. The former pollution comes from a particular 
identifiable source, including factories, storm sewers or pollutant discharges in 
discrete sites. in contrast, the diffuse source pollution comes from multiple 
dispersed sites.237 A regulatory system may not easily control diffuse pollution 
unlike point source pollution.238 One measure to manage diffuse source 
pollution is the creation of awareness amongst farmers of the best farming 
practices.
in England and wales the Catchment Sensitive Farming Project, which is 
voluntary in nature, is seeking to tackle the agricultural diffuse pollution.239 In 
this project, the farmers voluntarily engage by gaining advice and receiving 
incentives. This approach does not use coercive regulation to tackle diffuse 
pollution problems; instead, it gives emphasis to actions taken at the grass roots 
level and integrates with other catchment delivery mechanisms. For instance, the 
example of the wessex Catchment in England shows how the Catchment 
Sensitive Farming Project has been conducted at a very local level within small 
areas to control the nitrate problem.240 The project aims ‘a low cost, sustainable 
solution to the pollution of drinking water.’241
Naturally, however, the lower level (catchment or below) is seen as 
appropriate to manage diffuse pollution problems. For instance, it has been 
estimated that water pollution alone costs England and Wales up to £1.3 billion 
per year.242 From a pollutant-management point of view, the tragedy of the
236 National Audit Office, Tackling Diffuse Pollution, Printed July 2010, available 
www.eurosaiwgea.org/Environmental%20audits/.../2010%20-%20United last 
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commons does not consider contemporary diffuse pollution problems in water 
resources management. Rather, it focuses on the point source at which pollution 
is discharged into a water body. Likewise, the theory considers the threats to 
water resources purely from a water-resources user’s point of view.
In addition to direct pollution control and awareness creation, designations of 
protected zones are used to protect water resources from pollution.243 In 
England, the Environment Agency may ask the Secretary of State to designate 
areas as water protection zones.244 For instance, in 1999, a water protection zone 
was designated in the River Dee.245 Moreover, code of good agricultural 
practices has been developed and is used in the protected zones.246 The 
Environment Agency issues discharge consent and permit systems.247 The 
Environment Agency is also entrusted with the responsibility to regulate water 
quality deterioration through pollution, effluents discharge or sewerage.248 
Although land use planning may have significant contribution to enhance 
balanced utilization of water resources, clear rules are required.
Water uses within river basin are interdependent; water users impose costs of 
their overexploitation on others unless there are schemes to manage these 
externalities.249 Naturally, the management of the quality and quantity of water 
resources requires water system management. Upstream water users may not be 
encouraged to engage in watershed management unless there are policy 
instruments that compensate for their efforts.250 Unwise use of a water 
ecosystem may deteriorate its adjacent water bodies. In the context of the 
current Nile basin system Stebek notes that:
The current environmental degradation in upstream Eastern Nile basin is 
mainly attributable to the cumulative result of decades of deforestation and 
watershed mismanagement caused by the prolonged economic, social and 
political problems that Ethiopia has been forced to go through, and any 
external pressure towards this turmoil has directly contributed to the current 
state of the basin. Unless this trend is reversed, the forthcoming decades
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might possibly witness the further degradation and desertification of the 
basin that could cause the eventual (albeit gradual) drying up of the 
watercourse and along with it: the probable end of Egyptian agriculture 
through surface fresh waters.251
The pastureland example used by Hardin illustrates how grassland sustainability 
can be adversely affected due to the over-exploitation of grassland by herders. 
in the case of water resources, the possible ruin of water resources can, 
according to Hardin’s theory, be averted by regulating water users’ over­
exploitation. The linkage between the over-exploitation of one resource with 
another was not addressed by Hardin. Such isolated understanding of the 
commons problem may not enhance the sustainability of resources, but rather, 
enhance their demise. Not all water resources scarcity problems necessarily 
come from water over-use, wastage or water pollution. indeed, the problems 
may be attributable to the degradation of adjacent or farther-away resources 
because such practices have their own adverse impact on water systems.
5.6 Transboundary challenges
The tragedy of the commons suggests government regulation towards individual 
behaviour regulation, but it does not consider the impact of government failures 
which may lead to the ruin of shared water resources. The theory does not thus 
include the government among the parties and factors that can contribute to the 
ruin of water resources. Even if the tragedy of the commons theory puts the 
government inside its theoretical ambit, it may be unlikely that the government 
could impartially regulate its behaviour through rules formulated by itself, 
particularly, if that government is part of the problem of natural resources over­
use or quality deterioration. In shared water resources, tensions between 
governments are among the challenges in sustaining the resources.252
Notably, today, there are challenges in managing water resources in a way 
that is sustainable due to the action of governments for their short-term interests 
rather than riparian long-term common interests. A government may also run 
many large development projects that affect the availability of water and, as a 
government term of office is not long, short-term benefit-seeking by 
governments may be more problematic than by individuals.
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There is usually mismatch between water resources and administrative 
boundaries. As a result, action on one affects the other.253 The people at the local 
level ‘are closer to the problems, often understand them better, and have to live 
with the consequences of the environmental policy. At the same time, if the 
problem is one of transboundary pollution, the locals do not live with the 
consequences of their pollution. Those downstream do.’254 In nature, 
exploitation of water resources in parts of the water system affects the water 
users in other parts. Many of the water challenges are interconnected and 
interrelated, and world is currently encountering changing realities to which 
traditional institutional arrangements that focus on water quantity might not be 
adequately responsive.255
Hardin’s theory to water resources is inadequate to address present-day 
complex challenges, and its application towards addressing a range of water 
threats requires rethinking. While, water and its ecosystems should not be seen 
in isolation, the tragedy of the commons overlooks such linkages. The theory is 
more localized to the commons problems, rather than considering wider 
opportunities.
Water security challenges, whether local, national or global, are inextricably 
linked.256 In climate change, for instance, it was contended that ‘[t]he linkage 
among local, regional, and global environmental issues, and their relationship to 
meeting human needs, offer opportunities to capture synergies in developing 
response options and reducing vulnerability to climate, although trade-off 
between issues may exist.’257 * Climate change impacts on the water resources are 
a transcending and shared problem, which adversely affects the global
• 258community.
Naturally, in such contexts, the institutional arrangements need to 
accommodate a range of factors contributing to water insecurity.259 In particular, 
water security cannot only be achieved through institutional arrangements 
introduced at a national level to regulate water users’ behavior; rather, it 
requires comprehensive policy and law at various levels.260 For instance, at the 
European Union level, there was no water law designed to manage water
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resources by transcending administrative boundaries of member states. The laws 
and organizational structures were administrative boundary-oriented and 
fragmented, other than the ones that have been governed by treaties agreed upon 
between states sharing a water body.261
However, the European Water Framework Directive (WFD) has brought 
considerable change in the conventional water resources management 
organizational structures architecture of the Union. The WFD places water 
resources management at the river basin boundary level.262 Upon completion of 
the first cycle of the WFD implementation period, however, the river basin 
approach was criticised for its inability to accommodate local needs in the 
planning process of water resources.263 Markedly, river basin based water 
resources planning and management were contested for failure to accommodate 
‘local issues and locally planned action’.264
Across Europe, there are sixty-four transboundary water bodies that connect 
member states or non-member states.265 The European Union shares many trans­
boundary river basins with non-member states. The problems may be more 
complex when the water resources are shared with non-EU member state. In 
instances where a river basin crosses a boundary of a non-EU member state, the 
EU member state’s obligation is to endeavour to secure cooperation through 
bilateral agreements.266 Such cooperation is increasingly dependent on the 
willingness of the non-EU member state and the nature of their agreement.
The obligation of cooperation in shared water resources management 
between member states is relatively strict as compared to cooperation with non­
member states.267 This obligation is indispensable in the enhancement of 
integrated water resources protection and development. The failure of 
cooperation between states that share a river basin may not be an excuse to 
implement a WFD obligation, and a member state may implement this 
obligation within its administrative boundary, a sub-unit of a river basin.268 The 
EU Water Framework Directive requires each member state to establish the
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river basin district within its own jurisdiction or a coordinated management for 
the water bodies that transcend national boundaries.269
With shared water resources, institutional arrangements developed by a 
single country or level may not differ from the unregulated individual behaviour 
that can lead to the ruin of resources. Each level or government acting in an 
isolated manner may tend to over-use the resources. These levels formulate and 
render decisions independently, unless there are schemes to harmonize their 
actions. The tragedy of the commons theory considers the government as a 
single body (that can regulate individual resources users), and it does not 
envisage the regulation of government actions by supranational bodies. It thus 
undermines the significance of a multilevel governance approach (through 
regional and global bodies) in shaping institutional arrangements for water 
resources. Naturally, a water body is a complex system thereby making it 
difficult to determine a proper boundary, which requires taking into account the 
interconnectedness of the water system beyond the usual administrative 
boundaries and linkages.270
Conclusion
The major solutions suggested for solving the tragedy of the commons are either 
to appropriate the commons through developing institutional arrangements that 
confer private property rights prerogatives or, if the nature of the commons does 
not allow appropriation, to introduce coercive regulatory institutional 
arrangements that establish public rights and limit access to and use of the 
commons in relation to over-exploitation. For Hardin, the ‘tragedy’ is averted 
simply through the regulations introduced by the government to control over­
exploitation and pollution by resource users.
In both remedies, the role of the government agencies is decisive. In the 
context of water resources insecurity, the remedies formulated by the tragedy of 
the commons introduce prescriptive regulation, regulatory institutional 
arrangements establishing public rights, whilst introducing private property 
rights to restrict access to and use of water resources. The core issue is whether 
the depletion and degradation of water resources can be effectively regulated 
solely through coercive rules. In this regard, the theory fails to propose non­
coercive market rules and informal community arrangements that may be 
equally important to enhance water resources sustainability.
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Water resources have distinct characteristics from many other types of 
resource. This is mainly because water resource boundaries are usually large, 
the resources are uneven, uses and users are diverse and the resources are shared 
in a range of scales. Moreover, water availability is adversely affected not only 
by unsustainable water resources exploitation but also by water quality failures 
and water systems degradation. This is attributable to the interconnectedness of 
natural water systems with ecosystems. in many cases, water pressures 
transcend national boundaries, and water resources management cannot be 
effectively addressed in an isolated fashion. Actions in adjacent environments or 
in even farther locations may impact upon the availability of water. An isolated 
view of natural resources problems solely through the regulation of users’ 
demands thus excludes a range of water pressures that transcend national 
frontiers.
The introduction of a more integrated water resources management is thus 
required to avert water insecurity. Water resources problems are interconnected 
and need to be approached holistically. By doing so, a wide range of water 
resources pressures must be recognized and managed at internal and cross­
border levels. Hardin’s theory hardly provides complete solutions to the 
contemporary water security challenges. Present-day water resources challenges 
thus need comprehensive solutions and institutional arrangements for water 
resources management.
It may require water demand regulation at a local level. However, regulatory 
institutional arrangements for water demand alone may not sustain water 
resources because the challenges may involve a range of water pressures. in 
addition to well defined and coercive regulatory institutional arrangements, 
water security may require non-coercive regulatory institutional arrangements 
and effective implementation mechanisms. Thus present day water security 
challenges may need fundamental change in managing the resources beyond 
Hardin’s ‘traditional’ perspectives. In spite of the initiatives underway in water 
resources management, however, the concept of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ 
still has a big impact in the formulation of the policies, as a result of which there 
has not been much deviation from the ‘traditional’ way of managing water
resources. ■
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